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Mere Long Incarceration not Enough for Bail under UAPA: Punjab and Haryana High Court affirms

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  • Post published:November 24, 2025
  • Post last modified:November 24, 2025
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The Division Bench comprising of Gurvinder Singh Gill, J. and Ramesh Kumari, J. dismissed the bail applications filed by the accused persons involved in the murder of targeted murder of a Dera Sacha Sauda follower, alleged to be linked to the ongoing sacrilege cases in Punjab.

The Bench upheld the dismissal of bail invoking the high threshold under section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, 1967, the prima facie materials showing deep-rooted conspiracy and the accused person’s criminal antecedents.

QUESTIONS OF LAW INVOLVED

  • Whether the Trial Court erred in rejecting regular bail despite the alleged lack of direct evidence against the Appellants?
  • Whether disclosures by co-accused and confessional statements during investigation could form basis of prima facie satisfaction under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA?
  • Whether long incarceration and delay in trial dilute the statutory UAPA bar on bail?
  • Whether involvement in sacrilege-linked murder constitutes a terrorist attack under Section 15 UAPA?
  • Whether antecedents can be relied upon while assessing propensity and risk under UAPA bail parameters?

JUDGMENTS REFFERED

  • Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab1: If the Court on perusal of the case diary or the report made under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation, against such person, as regards commission of offence or offences under Chapter IV and/or Chapter VI of the UAP Act is prima facie true, such accused person shall not be released on bail or on his own bond.
  • NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali 2: On the face of it, the materials must show the complicity of the accused in commission of the offence. The materials/ evidence must be good and sufficient to establish a given fact or chain of facts constituting the stated offence, unless rebutted or contradicted by other evidence.
  • Sudesh Kedia v. Union of India3: The expression “prima facie” would mean that the materials/ evidence collated by the investigating agency in reference to the accusation against the accused concerned must prevail until contradicted and overcome or disproved by other evidence, and on the face of it, shows that complicity of the stated offence. It must be good and sufficient to establish a given fact or the chain of facts constituting the sated offence, unless rebutted or contradicted.
  • Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb4: Section 43D(5) per se does not oust the jurisdiction of the constitutional courts to grant bail on violation in Part III of the Constitution of India, but further stated that they have to be construed harmoniously.
  • Vernon v. State of Maharashtra5: The fundamental proposition of law laid down in K.A. Najeeb that a bail-restricting clause cannot denude the jurisdiction of a constitutional court in testing if continues detention in a given case would breach the concept of liberty enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India, would apply in a case where such a bail-restricting clause is being invoked on the basis of material with prima facie low-probative value or quality.
  • Harpreet Singh Talwar @ Kabir Talwar v. State of Gujarat through National Investigating Agency6: The rigor of Section 43D(5) of the UAPA would yield to the overarching mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution, especially where the trial is inordinately delayed or where the incarceration becomes punitive. However, such relaxation cannot possibly be automatic and must be evaluated in light of the specific facts and risks associated with each case.
  • Jagtar Singh Johal v. NIA7: The bail under section 43D(5) of the UAPA cannot be granted solely on the basis of long incarceration of the accused person and the same has to be viewed along with the gravity of offences which are supported by the relevant material provided by the NIA.   

RATIO DECIDENDI

  • Section 15 of the UAPA terms terrorist act as:-
    • Act done with the intent to threaten or likely to threaten the unity, integrity, security, economic security, or sovereignty of India;
    • Act done with the intent to threaten or likely to threaten the unity or sovereignty of India;
    • Act done with the intent to strike terror in the people or ay section of the people in India or any foreign country.
    • The above-said act should be done by using bombs, dynamites or other explosive substances or inflammables or firearms or other lethal material to cause or likely to cause the death of, or injuries to, any person or persons.
  • The proviso to Section 43(5)(d) of UAPA clearly states that if Courts are satisfied that the prima facie allegations against the accused are true after perusal of case diary or report made under Section 173 CrPC, bail cannot be granted.
  • Prima facie satisfaction is a low-threshold and presence of incriminating material suffices the denial of bail in UAPA Cases.
  • Criminal antecedents and past conduct are legitimate factors demonstrating propensity.
  • Confessional statements during investigation can be considered at bail stage under the UAPA framework.

The High Court’s judgment reinforces the stringent statutory framework governing bail under the UAPA and emphasizes the duty of the Courts to protect both national security and public faith in judicial process. The ruling upholds the principle that in terrorism-related conspiracies, collective intent, digital co-ordination, and criminal antecedents together satisfy the statutory prohibition, shifting the balance decisively against pre-trial release. 

  1. (2024) 5 SCC 403. ↩︎
  2. (2019) 5 SCC 1. ↩︎
  3. (2021) 4 SCC 704. ↩︎
  4. (2021) 3 SCC 713. ↩︎
  5. (2023) 15 SCC 56. ↩︎
  6. 2025 SCC On Line SC 1103. ↩︎
  7. 2024 SCC Online Del 89. ↩︎